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SUMMARY
 It is not only in Japan that traditional employment systems are being called
into question.  It has become conventional wisdom on the OECD conference
circuit that we are entering a new era of intensified global competition in which only
the most “flexible” firms can survive.  “Flexibility” and the elimination of rigidities,
particularly labour market rigidities, became, in the mid-1980s, the keynote of
prescriptions both for lack of competitiveness and for rising unemployment.  Even
earlier reservations about the desirability of preserving a “core” of stable, long-
serving, committed workers, differentiated from a flexible “periphery” have given
way to prescriptions for wholesale “down-sizing”.
There is a flexibility trade off.  Concern with labour market flexibility --
especially managers’ ability to hire and fire at will -- is strengthened in the Anglo-
Saxon economies by the inflexibility of the financial markets they face.  Japanese
firms, being more insulated from the short-term demands of shareholders, have
hitherto been able to afford more “rigid” employment systems from which they gain
the advantage of employee commitment and cooperative and flexible attitudes to
work.
But today the competitiveness/flexibility concern grows in Japan too.  The
lifetime employment/seniority-constrained pay and promotion system is under
attack.  Advocacy of change is common; assertions that wholesale change has
already taken place almost equally common.  The reasons are to be found partly in
the objective situations of many firms after four years of recession, partly in a loss
of self-confidence and a “resurgence of the American model”.
Actual change seems in fact to be marginal,  but there are a number of
grounds for expecting change in the future:  value change -- greater affluence,
diminished work ethic, and diminished egalitarianism;  the possible resurgence of
shareholder power; the declining influence of unions; the declining “intellectual
quality” of blue-collar and routine white-collar workers; increased inter-firm
competition and the reduction of industry cartel understandings; slower growth;
low-wage competition, particularly in future from China, and the “hollowing-out”
response thereto.
Those who have a stake in Japan’s “employee sovereignty” jimponshugi,
and would be reluctant to see it slide into just another version of “shareholder
sovereignty” Anglo-Saxon capitalism, might be expected to be proposing legislation
to bring company law in line with current Japanese reality.  Noone seems to be
doing so.
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THE END OF JOBS FOR LIFE? CORPORATE
EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS:  JAPAN AND ELSEWHERE
Ronald Dore
        The world economy may still be a long way from the globalised
borderlessness so often celebrated by our futurologists.  But the
“globalization of consciousness” -- should one call it? -- proceeds apace.
Perhaps “globalization of what the Japanese call joshiki, conventional
wisdom” would be a better way of putting it -- world-wide
homogenization of those common assumptions about trends in the political
economy of the advanced industrial countries that creep from academic
writing, (or the quasi-academic writing of OECD consultants), into
journalism and the speeches of politicians until they become a conventional
wisdom which dissenting voices, however backed by hard evidence, find it
hard to dent.
         One such piece of conventional wisdom is the pervasive belief that
the intensification of international competition and the accelerating pace
of technological change are having -- universally -- a devastating effect on
traditional patterns of employment.  Here is a typical expression of the
thesis in an influential essay by Ralf Dahrendorf which recently became a
best-seller in Italy as well as eliciting much comment in the UK:1
..the global market-place requires some of the same virtues
from all.  To use the fashionable word, economic actors need,
above all, flexibility.  Flexibility means, in the first instance,
the removal of rigidities.  Deregulation and less government
interference generally help to create flexibility; many would
add a lighter burden of taxation on companies and individuals.
Flexibility has increasingly come to signify loosening of the
constraints of the labour market.  Hiring and firing become
easier; wages can move downwards as well as upwards; there
is more and more part-time and limited-term employment;
workers must be expected to change jobs, change employers,
change locations of employment...  A career for life will be the
exception rather than the model.  People will be in and out of
work, employed full-time and part-time, in training and
retraining...
2     Picked almost at random is the latest Japanese expression of this
conventional wisdom that I have come across -- from a contribution to a
symposium on vocational high schools by a director of the Sumitomo
Trust Bank:2
       Nowadays the number of Japanese companies where the
personnel department does general recruitment of graduates
and school leavers is no longer more than a tiny minority.
There’s a tremendous change towards what is, after all, the
proper pattern (honrai no saiyo-keitai).  When they want
somebody for sales, they get a salesperson; when they want
somebody for personnel management they get a personnel
manager.  There are vast numbers of mini-businesses and
venture-businesses being formed....
Note, there, the honrai no, the “proper”.  It has two senses:  first and
probably foremost in the mind of a Japanese banker in 1995 “the way
things are done in the United States”; second, the way economic textbooks
describe the “efficient” working of the labour market.
I.  The Evidence?
     But what evidence is there that forms of employment are undergoing
drastic change in the Western world?  The OECD’s Employment Outlook
1993 looked at the average tenure of different age groups, and the pattern
of change during the 1980s for nine countries.3  The country with the
shortest average tenure -- i.e., with the greatest job mobility -- was the
United States and tenures had become slightly shorter in 1991 than in 1983
for men, though overall just slightly longer for women.  The same applied
to the UK, though there was no change for the age groups up to 50; all the
fall was in the older age groups for both sexes, and probably reflected the
effects of the sharp recession of the early 1980s which led to a
considerable volume of “early retirement” redundancies.  The Netherlands
also showed a tendency for average tenures to fall (1985-1990), but from
a quite high level; male workers aged 55 and over still had been in their
jobs for more than 22 years, and women for nearly 15 years.  The country
3with the biggest increase in average job tenures (1989 compared to 1979)
was Japan, a rise of three years -- from 17 to over 20 -- for 50-54-year-old
men and from 10 to 12.5 for women in the same age group.  Germany --
which shares with Japan the longest overall tenure pattern -- also saw some
increase between 1984 and 1990.
More recent evidence from Britain -- up to 1993 -- is derived from
the Labour Force Survey and the General Household Survey.4  Average
tenures have continued to decline slowly for men (by 20 percent 1975-
1993) while rising slightly for women, but there is an emerging pattern of
polarisation; higher income full-time jobs are not becoming more unstable;
it is the lower income, particularly part-time, self-employed and temporary
jobs which are held for increasingly shorter periods.  Instability of
employment, in other words, is increasingly a problem for the poor.
 To the British statistical evidence one can add anecdotal evidence,
and the observations of practitioners as opposed to pundits.  The Financial
Times5 reported on a number of firms in Yorkshire which had markedly
improved their productivity, product quality and sales in recent years, many
of them by the deliberate adoption of Japanese management principles --
insistence on cleanliness and discipline, simplification of the pay/job link,
kamban-type stock control, and so on.  The article concluded:
There was a refreshing absence of the “no jobs for life” mantra
in any of these companies.  Mr.  Bill Chard, regional organiser
of the GMB general union, warned that employers who insisted
on preaching this doctrine risked indirectly contributing to the
economic stagnation that was harming their own businesses.
“People who are fearful of losing their jobs are going to be
afraid of spending money”, he said.  “Business needs to be
aware of this”.  
     Recent Japanese statistics do not offer evidence of any great shifts in
employment practices either.  Average tenures of the employed population
covered by the wage survey rose through the recession, 1990 to 1994,
from 12.5 to 12.8 years, though this has to be looked at in relation to the
average age.  For university graduates, the increase in the average age and
the increase in average tenure were identical -- indicating no change in
4employment stability.  Overall, the average age increased by 0.2 years more
than the average tenure which suggests a slight increase in job turnover,
mostly concentrated in the high-school graduate category (where there was
an increase of one year in age, and of 0.5 years in average tenure).6
A similar story -- of changes more likely to be explained by cyclical
than by secular structural factors -- emerges from the Japanese statistics for
job turnover -- though these are confined to firms with 30 or more
workers.  In the first year of the recession, 1992, overall job separations
fell to their lowest point since 1988 -- an indication that an
overwhelmingly large portion of separations has always taken the form of
voluntary quits by people who were hoping to better themselves by
changing jobs.  Thereafter, it depends what survey you use.  One7 shows a
continuing decline in separations as the recession continued, another a
slight increase8.  The former gives a breakdown of separations into their
various categories.  The interesting categories are those which can be
interpreted as abandonment by employers of the “lifetime commitment”
guarantee.  There was, indeed, a slight increase -- 1993 as compared with
1991 -- in the proportion of separations accounted for by disciplinary
dismissals and redundancy dismissals; in absolute figures an increase of
76,000 to make a total of just over a quarter of a million for disciplinary
dismissals, and an increase of 114,000 to a total of 367,000 for
redundancies.  These figures, however, have to be set in the context of five
and a half million total separations, a total gainfully employed labour force
of 64 million, and a total employee labour force of 52 million.
II.  The Cult of Flexibility
So if there is little evidence of massive changes in employment
patterns, why should there be such widespread talk about the “end of jobs
for life”?  Why the belief that the intensification of global competition has
created an overwhelming need for flexibility which can only be gained at
the expense of greater insecurity for employees?
The first answer is a kind of “End of History” answer.  It goes like
this.  The story of the leading Western industrial nations from the beginning
of the 20th century until about 1980 was a story of steadily increasing
5intervention by the state to control the employment contract and the labour
market in order to afford some kind of protection to employees.  It was a
trend of uneven tempo, frequently moving faster under left-wing than
under right-wing governments  -- the American New Deal and the Great
Society; the spate of legislation in post-war Germany and Japan.  But the
movement was generally in the same direction -- towards what the British
jurist Dicey identified at the beginning of the century9 as a trend away from
individualistic liberalism towards collectivism, away from laissez-faire
freedom of contract back towards “status” -- towards legal constraints on
that freedom designed to protect the poor and the weak against the strong
and the rich -- in the words of a well-known 1960s version of this “Whig”
thesis, the gradual build-up of a “web of rule” with the cooperation of the
state, the labour movement and employers.10 
The concrete expressions of that trend were wide-ranging:  legal
privileges for labour unions; regulation of hours of work and holidays;
health and safety legislation; protection against unfair dismissal; minimum
wage legislation, restraints on large-scale redundancies; rules for the
employment of the disabled, compulsory unemployment insurance,
workman’s compensation insurance; social security systems, etc etc.
 The apotheosis of this long-term trend came in the 1970s.  The
growing strength of labour unions (in part attributable to state protection)
exacerbated the problems of inflation control.  Corporatist attempts to deal
with this by gaining union cooperation in wage restraint led to further
concessions to the unions, further measures for worker protection.  
But what one might, until then, have been forgiven for thinking was
a long-run and irreversible evolutionary trend of modern societies11, proved
to be by no means so.  The crucial factor responsible for what looks like a
long-term reversal of that trend was a sharp political shift in the two
Anglo-Saxon societies with the largest concentration of OECD-dominant-
opinion-forming economists -- the election of Margaret Thatcher in Britain
and Ronald Reagan in the US.  They and their supporters had a great deal
in common.  Both had a strong hostility to trade unions; both rejected
totally corporatist attempts to combine growth with inflation control
through “concertation among the social partners” in favour of free market
bargaining under the strict discipline of a restrictive monetary policy; both
believed that the market was a meritocratic instrument which rewarded
6virtuous enterprise and had an antipathy towards any kind of engineered
egalitarianism which might hamper its efficient operation.
What had, hitherto, been seen as “enlightened” labour-protection
legislation came to be denounced as “rigidities” which impeded the
efficient allocation of labour resources, and hence acted as a brake on
general prosperity.   Two specific circumstances reinforced the urgency of
the attack on “rigidities” which developed particularly in authoritative
OECD reports in the course of the decade. 
 The first was the impact of Japanese competition, particularly in the
first half of the decade when the yen was relatively undervalued.  The need
to restore national “competitiveness” came to be spoken of as a goal which
should over-ride other domestic policy considerations; and the main cause
of loss of competitiveness -- and hence of slower growth -- was seen to be
the rigidities which slowed the response to technical change; the clinging
to out-dated “smoke-stack” industries, the inabililty to adopt new
production technologies. 
The second was the other symptom of “Eurosclerosis” -- the growth
of endemic unemployment, and the growing popularity of the view that
“labour market rigidities” were exacerbating the employment problem. 
There were the a priori arguments that high social-security costs,
legal restraints on dismissal, or minimum wage requirements were a
deterrent to employers who might otherwise take on new workers, and
empirical evidence that a large number of indicators of mobility -- the
percentage of workers with short job tenures, turnover rates etc -- all
showed differences among countries which seemed to be directly related
to the degree to which labour market regulations restrict the freedom to
hire and fire.  Italy appeared as the country with the least movement and the
most rigid policy regime.  At the other end of the spectrum, the United
States and, in Europe, Denmark, came out as the countries with the least
regulated system and the greatest movement in the labour market.12   The
fact that the United States, where employers have greater freedom to hire
and fire than anywhere in Europe, was also a country with relatively lower
unemployment and an impressive record of new-job creation reinforced the
argument that the road to curing unemployment lay in the reduction of
labour protective legislation.
7At any rate the trend-reversal was striking and Europe-wide.  As
already mentioned, many countries had extended the scope of protective
legislation during the “corporatist” 1970s.  The last such extension was in
France, in the early “socialist” phase of the Mitterand government before
its major turn-around.  Thereafter, all legislative changes appear to have
been in the opposite direction -- relaxation of hiring rules in Italy, the end
of control over redundancies in France, and wholesale institutional change
in Britain -- the large-scale reduction in trade union privileges, limitations
by size of firm and by period of employment on the right to sue for unfair
dismissal, much greater freedom to hire and fire on temporary and part-
time contracts and so on.  
 These, then, were the emphases of the rigidity/flexibility debate at the
time of its first great flowering in the mid-1980s.   A decade later, in the
mid-1990s, four things have changed.  First, it has become clear that,
although, with deregulation of the labour market, the “right of managers
to manage” has become more untrammelled in Europe -- certainly in
Britain -- than it has been for decades, unemployment rates have not fallen,
nor has there been much obvious improvement in the competitiveness of
the internationally trading sector.  Secondly, it has become part of the
received wisdom that there is a clear connection between the lower
unemployment rates of the United States as compared with Europe, and the
fact that wages for unskilled jobs have fallen much more rapidly in the
United States -- income inequality has increased at a rapid rate.  An
increasing number of the jobs created in the US are “lousy jobs” which
would not be created in Europe because of the existence of social security
guarantees.  A person with few skills is better off being unemployed in
Germany than employed in the United States.
And consequently, the third change is the increasing attention being
paid to the social security systems themselves.  Everybody is “rethinking
the welfare state”.  Few will admit to the intention of “driving” the
unemployed into work by cutting off benefit entitlements.  That is what
most of the proposed changes amount to, but the ostensible emphasis is
rather on making the social security system more “work-friendly”, reducing
the work disincentive effects of the social security net.
But, fourthly, the preoccupation with irreducible unemployment,
especially long-term unemployment, has become detached from the
8concern with competitiveness.   In the mid-1980s, the same pursuit of
flexibility, the same measures to “free up” the labour market, were
supposed to be a cure for both slow growth and slow adaptation to
technological change on the one hand, and also for unemployment on the
other.   Now, flexibility is less discussed as a cure for unemployment; the
flexibility debate has moved on to concentrate, rather, on matters of
management strategy, with the emergence of business school doctrines of
the need for “restructuring”, “re-engineering”, dividing core from
periphery, creating the virtual corporation and so on.
III.  The Other Kind of Rigidity
 The debate described above was largely about legislated rigidities
in the labour market.  What was not always recognised in the early stages
of the debate, at least, was the importance of self-imposed rigidities, most
fully exemplified in the Japanese firm.  By self-imposed rigidities, I mean
the acceptance, by managers, of a wide range of constraints on their
freedom of action -- lifetime employment guarantees, tight seniority
constraints on promotion, acceptance of the need to engineer consent, to
maintain close consultation with employees or their unions -- that
acceptance of constraint being rewarded by a “commitment” on the part of
employees which greatly facilitates the firm’s “flexible” adaptation to new
technologies and new market opportunities.  “Committed” employees, not
fearful of dismissal, are more willing to accept a complete change of job
function when new technology makes their former job obsolete, more
willing to undergo the necessary training; less likely to leave the firm and
take with them the investment the firm has made in their training; more
willing to accept wage restraint when the firm faces temporary difficulties,
etc.
   Flexible rigidities13 -- which spelt out these characteristics of the
Japanese corporation (and also of other “rigidities” in the Japanese
economic structure like relational sub-contracting) -- was the title of my
own contribution to the flexibility debate.  But the distinction was already
being made in Britain in the form of a contrast between “numerical” and
“functional” flexibility.  The former was freedom to hire and fire at will;
the latter was the flexibility in the use of their time and skills which the
9manager of “committed” employees can ask of them.  And in a Britain in
whose manufacturing industry there remained a good deal of shop floor
control by unions -- maintained by wage agreements which involved
jealously guarded job demarcations -- the value of such functional
flexibility was not difficult to recognise.   It was further underlined by the
practice, introduced by Japanese firms building greenfield sites in Britain,
of concluding “single-union agreements” with the amenable electricians
union -- agreements which simplified job categories, loosened the
connection between wage rates and job functions, and generally removed
any possibility of disputes over job demarcation or the authority of
managers in matters of work organization on the shop floor.
In the second half of the 1980s, there had emerged something like a
consensus on the flexibility issue14.   Wise management would, indeed, seek
to build a core  labour force of “involved”, “committed” employees --
though there was no consensus as to how far towards Japanese levels of
lifetime employment guarantees one should go.   But a good deal of the
firm’s work could be performed under the supervision of this core labour
force by a periphery of temporary, part-time and fixed contract workers to
whom the firm owed no obligations.  Wages of the core workers were
close to being a fixed cost, but the cost of periphery labour could be highly
variable depending on the economic cycle.  In Britain and a number of
other European countries, changes in labour legislation which reduced
social security charges etc on temporary and part-time labour and
facilitated short-term contracts made the core-periphery division more
viable.
From there to the restructuring/re-engineering/down-sizing  rhetoric
of -- primarily American -- business schools in the 1990s was a step in two
directions.   One was the emphasis on the restructuring of businesses to
release shareholder value, which reflected a dominant concern with
financial manipulation and largely ignored the effects of restructuring on
the “involvement” or work motivations of employees.  But it was also,
secondly, a development of the core/periphery doctrine -- advocating the
whittling away of the core and the expansion of the “flexibly” employed
periphery, in some extreme versions to the point of defying the Coase-
theorem altogether and reducing the firm to a network of fixed-term
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contracts -- the “virtual corporation” in the words of a much-quoted paper
by Peter Drucker.15
IV.  Flexibility:  Micro and Macro
Such was the background of analysis and rhetoric which has
produced the “cult of flexibility” and what the Financial Times journalist
called the “‘no jobs for life’ mantra” -- but predominantly in the countries
of what Michel Albert called Anglo-Saxon capitalism.  That debate has
been largely about how to manage individual firms -- what one might call
micro-flexibility.  But there is a rather different question which one might
call macro-flexibility:  what are the mechanisms, and what determines the
speed with which whole economies adjust to changes in technology and
changes in market competition -- caused, for instance, by the emergence of
low-wage overseas competitors particularly in the production of labour-
intensive goods?  
Broadly, one can distinguish three types of society-wide adjustment
mechanisms.16
1. Through the external labour market.
Firms in declining industries, firms with obsolete technology, cut back
their work force or go bankrupt.  The unemployed workers, perhaps after
having acquired new skills through training, eventually find jobs in firms
in expanding markets -- typically venture businesses started by
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs.
2. Through intergenerational transition.
Firms in declining industries -- perhaps in some way protected by the state
-- decline gradually, reducing their work force primarily by natural
wastage, recruiting few replacements.  New labour market entrants --
hopefully equipped by the educational system with new skills -- are
recruited into the expanding firms in the advancing sectors.
3. Through intra-firm diversification.
The entrepreneurship and the venture capital needed to exploit new
opportunities and expand in growing markets is provided within the
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declining industry firms, which organically “grow” new business divisions,
rather than seeking to acquire them through acquisitions.  The new skills
required for diversification may be taught to the existing work force as
well as obtained through recruitment of new graduates.  The firm as
corporate entity survives but the nature of its business changes.
The “no jobs for life” thesis assumes -- as do economic textbooks,
and most policy-makers in Anglo-Saxon countries -- that the
overwhelmingly dominant adjustment mechanism is the first, the external
labour market.  In Japan, however, the ideal form has been a mixture of the
second (in the case of agriculture or small family-firm sanchi textiles) and
the third.  Examples are the shift of the whisky firm Suntory into
pharmaceuticals or the various forms of diversification of Japanese steel
firms over the last decade and a half -- the moves of Japan Steel, for
example, into computer software, silicon wafer manufacture, plant
engineering.  Not all these moves have been successful by any means, and
the speed at which employment can be created in new fields frequently does
not match the labour force reductions in the old fields.  (Japan Steel
recently still had 15,000 surplus workers on shukko -- “leased out” to
other firms.)  But it remains the ideal form of adjustment which firms seek
to achieve.
V.  Flexibility in Labour Markets; Flexibility in Financial Markets:  A
Trade-Off
There is one precondition for that diversification mechanism to
remain the ideal mechanism for structural adjustment.  It requires “patient
capital”, to use the term which has become common in British debates
about short-termism.  Japanese firms can make the long-term investments
required to diversify, even if that means that they produce low, or even
negative profits for several years running.  Their managers know that they
can do this -- if necessary paying their tiny conventional dividend payment
out of reserves as the average firm was doing in 199317 -- provided they
retain the confidence of their bankers, and their suppliers and their
distributors who, among them, in most cases make up a majority of their
shareholders.  And “retaining their confidence” means retaining their belief
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that the firm’s troubles are primarily a consequence of its objective
situation, not of mismanagement, it being accepted that the constraints
under which they manage -- maintaining the lifetime employment
commitment, for example -- are unavoidable.  
Anglo-Saxon firms face shareholders who are much less forgiving in
a very different financial environment.  It is a fortunate firm which has a
majority shareholder who is interested in the long-term prosperity of the
firm -- who has some interest in doing business with the firm which
overrides his interest in making a profit out of his shareholding investment.
Most firms are at the mercy of fund managers anxious to make sure that
their annual performance as earners of dividends and capital gains should
show them up well in the fund manager performance league tables which
the analysts prepare for investment advisors.  When a firm’s earnings fall
below “the market’s” expectations, share prices fall; when share prices fall,
thus putting a lower market price on the firm’s assets, the possibility of a
takeover bid increases, and so does the probability of the bidder offering
the shareholders such windfall gains that the bid succeeds -- and with it the
probability that a new dominant shareholder will replace the existing
management.
Under such tight financial market constraints, it is small wonder,
then, that British or American managers seek by all means to keep profit
levels as high as they can in a recession, and small wonder that they attach
the greatest importance to their freedom to hire and fire -- to cut their wage
bills to match cuts in orders and sales.  
In short, there would seem to be a flexibility trade-off.  It is precisely
because they face the inflexible demands of shareholders in financial
markets that British or American firms need flexibility in their labour
markets.  And it is because they have flexibly accommodating shareholders
that Japanese firms can accept more rigid constraints on their ability to hire
and fire.
The difference is, of course, at the heart of the distinction between
Anglo-Saxon “shareholder sovereignty” capitalism and Japanese
“employee-sovereignty” capitalism, between an economy dominated by
financial markets and run predominantly in the interests of the owners of
capital (a true capitalism, some would say), and an economy which is run
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more in the interests of the managers and employees of corporations --
what some would call a deviant or distorted capitalism.
VI.  Change in Japan:  Debate and Practice
Those loaded terms “true” and “deviant” can actually be given some
legal content, insofar as Japanese company law does specify “true” capital-
owner-sovereignty as the basic legal principle of Japanese corporate
governance.  The actual practical reality which has developed in Japan in
the post-war period has so developed in defiance of those legal
prescriptions.
That, however, is irrelevant to the moral and political question:
which form of capitalism is the better one.  A decade ago, when Japan was
triumphantly recovering from the first big endaka shock and resuming the
path of vigorous investment, export growth and GNP growth, there was a
quite widespread consensus in Japan, (as expressed in English, for example
in Morita’s autobiography18),  around the idea that Japanese corporations
had strong advantages compared with, say, American corporations --
strengths to be attributed to the loyalty, conscientiousness, innovativeness
and flexibility of employees which was part and parcel of lifetime
employment, seniority-plus-merit pay systems and promotion systems, and
the system of cross-shareholding which insulated firms from financial
markets and made these employment practices possible.
But no longer.  Although few are as confident about the reality of
change as the banker quoted at the beginning of this paper, the view that
change must come -- and is desirable -- seems now the dominant one.  “The
end of lifetime employment”; an end to the “bad egalitarianism” (aku-
byodo) of the seniority system, and instead overwhelming emphasis on
ability (noryoku-shugi) seem to be the dominant themes, with the
argument that more attention has to be given to the claims of shareholders
as a subsidiary motif.  
Why this change of mood? One can think of a number of factors.
1. The first and most obvious is the recession and the pressure on
profits.  Many firms found themselves with large numbers of surplus
employees, and managers came to be acutely conscious of the cost of the
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lifetime employment guarantee.  The problem was exacerbated by the so-
called “lump-generation” problem.  Many of the superfluous employees
were graduates over 45 who had been recruited in large numbers in the
early 70s at a time of rapid expansion.  They were reaching the age at which
-- had that expansion continued at the same rate -- they would now have
been entitled to expect a senior managerial post.  Many of these have been
shunted sideways -- the so-called shukko practice of transfer to a
subsidiary or dependent supplier, sometimes initially without loss of salary,
but usually with eventual full transfer, though sometimes with the
compensation of a higher retirement age.
The surplus labour situation has so far only produced frequent
assertions of the need to change, but not much change itself.  No major
firm has announced large-scale compulsory redundancies.  Nor do many of
the “lump generation”, although they may have been forced to move to new
jobs with loss of salary,  seem to have been pushed into complete early
retirement.  1993-1994 participation rates for men have been higher than
they have ever been for 55-59-year-olds (94 percent), and higher than since
1982 for 60-64-year-olds (75 percent).19
Nor does there seem to have been any strong trend to replace “core”
employees with temporary and contract workers who can be more flexibly
dismissed.  Agency-despatched workers (limited by law to 16 occupations)
still make up only 0.2 percent of the work force, and contract workers less
than two percent.  Part-time women workers have been steadily growing
in numbers for the last two decades (now one quarter of all women
workers), but the proportion of the work force who are “regular
employees” was still (in 1992, at any rate) hovering around 80 percent.20
2. A second and understandable factor is the new impetus given to the
“hollowing out” process after the shock of the unexpected yen revaluation
between April and August 1995.  Many firms which were heavily involved
with exports or faced import competition decided that they could only
survive by moving production overseas to areas of lower wage costs, and
that they would have to do it at a pace which would make it difficult to
deal with the run-down of their home labour force merely by natural
wastage.  The subsequent fall of the yen relieved the immediate pressure,
but left firms still convinced of the reality of the long-run need to relocate.
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3. But there seem to be other less concrete psychological factors
involved too:  a whole syndrome which might be called “the resurgence of
the American model”.  Recall the honrai no of the banker quoted on the
first page.  The idea that the way things are done in America is the “proper”
way of doing things has been a recurrently pervasive one ever since the
post-war occupation period.  The self-confident assertion “we have it
better” has always been tinged with a slight air of bravado.  That bravado
has been more easily forthcoming when the economy has been bounding
ahead, and never more than in the late 1980s when Japan seemed poised to
displace American dominance in one field of high technology
manufacturing after another, and the Americans themselves showed an
enormous appetite for books which told them they were no longer Number
One21.
 
In the 1990s, however, the picture has looked different.  The
American comeback -- in semi-conductors and the manufacture of
equipment for the making of semi-conductors -- and the strengthening of
the American lead in other fields like micro-processors and software,
aerospace and pharmaceuticals, and at a time when Japan is mired in
depression, has changed the mood in both countries.  The Wall Street
Journal runs frequent triumpalist features on the end of the Japanese
miracle, and Japanese self-confidence has evaporated.  Silicon Valley and
“venture business” have now become the admired model.  Few cling to the
belief that Japan’s alternative -- the entrepreneurship of the managers of
giant corporations and the provision of risk capital out of the reserves of
those corporations -- can in the long-run compete.   And Japan cannot
develop its own venture business until the lure of the giant corporation is
destroyed and those corporations cease to capture the best and brightest of
every generation of science graduates in order to turn them into loyal
lifelong salarymen.
Two other factors have favoured this “resurgence of the American
model”.  One is external pressure -- gaiatsu from foreign, predominantly
American, trade negotiators claiming that Japan’s “deviant” form of
capitalism is, indeed, unfairly deviant and a detraction from the open
reciprocity which every trading nation owes its trading partners in an
increasingly integrated global economy.  The legislation which recently
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made it much simpler for shareholders to sue Boards of Directors for
losses caused them by negligently inept decisions is an example of a legal
measure designed to pull the system towards the shareholder-sovereignty
pole and one which sprang directly from American pressure during the
Structural Impediment Negotiations at the beginning of the decade.
The other is the growing diffusion in Japan of the ideology of
American free-market capitalism and individualistic competition.  It is
mediated, first, by the growing number of Japanese managers sent by their
firms to spend a couple of years at American business schools -- a flow
considerably increased since yen revaluation reduced the costs of doing so.
Once, Japanese managers went to American business schools to learn how
the American mind ticked, in order to better cope in dealing with
Americans in world markets.  Now the Japanese manager is more likely to
come back brainwashed and convinced of the need for Japanese firms to
become as efficient as their American rivals.  The influence of these
managers -- large Japanese corporations now count their MBAs in their
hundreds rather than their tens -- is reinforced by the growing influence in
the media, in the business magazines and television commentaries, of
economists who acquired their PhD in American graduate schools and are
“true believer” adherents of the free-market-competition-is-the-only-route-
to-efficiency doctrines of neo-classical economics.
Those doctrines have four dominant manifestations in contemporary
Japanese discussions.
a) The demand for deregulation and the introduction of freer
competition in all those (predominantly non-tradables) sectors of the
economy where regulation and tolerated cartelisation and dampened
competition have preserved high levels of employment -- i.e., low levels of
productivity and of efficiency.  That the cost of giving the sovereign
consumer his higher levels of efficiency, and hence cheaper and better
products, is likely to be European levels of high unemployment --
unemployment affecting a significant proportion of those same sovereign
consumers in their role as producers -- is not thought to be important,
except by a small dissident minority22.
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b) Deregulation particularly of financial markets, at the expense of the
relational banking which has been one feature of the system which has
hitherto insulated Japanese corporations from shareholder pressure.
c) The development of free and active labour markets in which people
are hired for their established specialties and dismissed when they are not
needed -- thus securing a better match of skills to jobs and avoiding the
wastefulness of the concealed unemployment which observance of the
lifetime employment guarantee currently entails.
d) An end to the bureaucratic seniority-constrained career-management
practices of Japanese large firms and replacement by interpersonal
competition, performance-related pay and promotion by merit alone and
not by seniority.  
This last call -- for the replacement of the nenko system by
noryokushugi -- has been a recurring one for at least the three decades that
I have been intermittently studying the personnel practices of Japanese
companies, but it is certainly more strident in recent years than it has ever
been before.  My impression is, however, that, although there have been
one or two spectacular deviations from traditional practices -- such as the
recent Sony decision to remunerate Board-level executives partly in
American-style share options -- in most corporations the “shift to
noryokushugi” has meant only marginal changes in promotion practices --
for example shifting from the tenth to the fifth year of employment the
point at which a cohort of new graduate entrants starts to get salaries
differentiated according to performance and not all of the same amount, or
a lowering of the conventional minimum age for appointment to the rank
of section or department chief.  
Unfortunately concrete data on changes in individual firms’ practices
are hard to come by.  A recent Japan Productivity Centre publication23
seeks to measure change by looking at the wage spread of graduate
managers across the whole economy.  Whereas, to take 50-54-year-old
graduate managers, in 1981 the ninth decile manager’s salary was 12
percent higher than that of the median manager, and the first decile manager
was 36 percent below, in 1993 the figures were, respectively, 30 percent
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and 27 percent.  In other words the top-to-bottom percentage spread had
increased by 9 percentage points but the median had shifted sharply
downwards within that spread.  This, however, conflates differences within
firms with differences among firms, and is also obviously affected by the
expansion in graduate ouptputs that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s,
probably implying a rather greater spread in the natural-ability range of
graduates.   Another national-average statistic which the report quotes is
the seniority wage premium for graduates, comparing 1993 with 1975.  At
all tenure categories up to those with 25-29 years’ service the premium had
slightly diminished -- those in that last category, for instance, were getting
2.2 times the current starting salary in 1975, but 2.15 times in 1993.
Beyond that, however, the premium had increased.  For those with over 35
years’ service what had been 2.2 times the starting salary had become 2.5
times.  A possible explanation, as the report suggests, is that in recent years
less able older managers have more frequently been shunted out into
shukko positions, leaving only the more able managers to be counted.  In
any case, the differences are marginal.  And as for accelerated promotion,
the national wage survey which cross-tabulates rank and age shows clearly
that any changes in innovative companies’ practice are entirely
overwhelmed by the effects of the maturation of the system -- slower
growth means having to wait longer for promotion.  See the following
table for firms with more than 1000 employees:
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TABLE 1
Occupants of Selected Ranks by Age Group (%)
     Sub-Section Chief (Kakari-cho) Division Chief (Bucho)
Under 35 35-39 40 or over Under 45 45-49 50 or over
1976 31.8 31.9 36.3 24.5 31.1 41.4
1984 18.3 33.1 48.6 12.5 37.3 50.2
1994 16.4 23.5 60.1 7.6 27.8 64.6
Source:  Chingin kozo kihon chosa (Basic Survey of Wage Structure), various
years.
VII.  Prospects for Future Change
So one is forced to conclude that all the brave talk about fundamental
change in the system has so far failed to materialize in anything more than
marginal changes in practice.  Will it always be so? There are several
reasons for thinking that the system really is under genuine pressure, and
that slowly, over the long-run, it may change -- and in an American
direction.  I list below some of the major factors at work.  
1. The first is affluence and the change in values.  Pick up any
Japanese weekly magazine and one will find demonstrated the truth of
Daniel Bell’s Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.  Work plays little
part in the life-styles they celebrate; spending plays an enormous part.  For
the generation now in their fifties, the competition to get into a “good
firm” was intense; the difference that it made to one’s life chances, to one’s
position in society, to one’s ability to satisfy the ambitions of one’s self-
sacrificing parents, made the effort worth while.  And if one succeeded, one
was not going to jeopardise one’s luck by being anything other than a
model employee.  Now, the difference between the first prize and the
consolation prizes is not so great.  Those who have “made it” into a good
firm are not so grateful.  Managers cannot expect of them quite the same
sacrifices as they could of their parents.  Tanshin funin -- being “posted”
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to a distant part of Japan or the world without one’s family -- used to be
taken for granted.  Now it is written of as gross disregard for personal
rights.  Karoshi -- death from overwork -- used to be an occasion for
mourning the loss of a loyal comrade whose physique was not quite up to
the work load that everybody was undertaking.  Now, it is something for
which the family gathers evidence in order to sue the over-demanding
employer.  Sensitivity to foreign criticism that the Japanese compete
unfairly by working too hard has produced official targets for reducing the
work week from over 2,000 to 1,800 hours a year -- for the workers whose
work hours are counted because they are paid overtime.  But the real over-
workers were, and still are, the university graduate staff whose work hours
are not counted.  It was their willingness to work through several weekends
running when a new product was being rushed to the market which was a
major factor in producing the competitive edge which Japanese firms held
in world markets.  That willingness to sacrifice personal and family life is
surely diminishing in the world of the leisure boom.  
But it has not, by any means disappeared.  Nor does it seem that the
examination rat-race which occupies those crucial teenage years when
Japanese men and some Japanese women acquire those habits of diligent
application which they subsequently carry into the workplace is much
diminished in intensity.  The best statistical indicator is probably attendance
at the cram schools, and taking an extra year or more between high school
and university in order to get into a university higher up the prestige scale
and hence, eventually, into a better job.  Neither index shows any marked
decline.
So shift in work values there might be, but it works slowly and has
not yet reached the point at which managers might calculate that the
“dedicated diligence” pay-off bought by the lifetime employment guarantee
is no longer worth the cost.
Another part of the value system, besides the work-leisure balance,
which is under attack is egalitarianism.   The key words here are those
already mentioned:  aku-byodo -- “bad equality” and  noryoku-shugi --
meritism, the subject of much discussion in management magazines.  What
does seem to be lacking in such discussions is concrete indications of what
noryoku-shugi should mean in practice.  Managerial careers were always
governed by a mixture of seniority and merit, so how should the mixture
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change? Should the salary spread among managers with, say, 20 years
seniority ideally be 30 percent?  Or 40?  Should bright and able young
people be appointed to section chief positions in their mid-20s?  Equally
rare seems to be any discussion of why the “wisdom of the ages” produced
the seniority system in the first place, and what might be its advantages in
maximizing cooperative activity and the propensity to strive for
organizational rather than personal goals.  Economists have sought
rationalizations for the seniority promotion system in terms of “rank-order
tournaments”24 -- rationalizations in the sense that they explain the
efficiency of the system via its power to evoke effort in a purely se lf-
interested every-man’s-hand-against-his-fellow competition.  What they
leave out is the paradox that one wins out in this promotion competition
precisely by exhibiting not just skill and diligence, but also unaggressively,
uncompetitively cooperative behaviour.
But promotion systems are planned not for the economist’s abstract
universal individual, but for particular types of individuals with the
particular sentiments, the particular mix of selfishness and altruism, of
pushiness and cooperativeness which count as normal in their society.  And
those sentiments can change.  The generation of CEOs just retiring were
often “men of the people”.  They may have got to Tokyo Law School but
from families where no one had been to a university before, and from
primary schools at whose reunions they continued to meet childhood pals
who now worked on the shop floor.  A number of them had first shown
their leadership qualities and initiative as leaders of their firm’s militant
post-war union.   The future CEOs now in their twenties are more likely
to have been segregated from future shop-floor workers at the age of 11
into one of the elite selective schools, and far more likely to be the son of
a professional or managerial worker with a good university education.  A
few generations of genuinely meritocratic social selection with a very high
degree of equality of educational opportunity is likely, by genetic as well
as cultural and economic processes, to produce an ever-more-exactly self-
reproducing class system.  That sense of social solidarity which underlies
the egalitarianism of postwar Japan is a diminishing asset.  Transmitted
greed -- envy of the vast salaries of American CEOs -- is still only
occasionally admitted to, but it would be unwise to discount its force.   So
far, however, any such process seems to be glacial.  If one looks at the
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summary tables for the division of value added in Japanese companies, it
seems that, in 1985, the nearly four and a half million Japanese executives
(Board members and above) were, on average getting a salary (including
bonuses) only 34 percent larger than the average employee member of their
companies’ 31.4m workforce.  In 1994, (by which time the relative
numbers were 5.7m and 38.5m.) it was 42 percent larger.  For
manufacturing, (where the numbers of executives increased by 12 percent
and of other employees by only four percent) the increase was from 43 to
48 percent.25
2. The second factor is the possible resurgence of the shareholder.
Several factors would seem to promote it.
a) Pressure from the American government in trade talks.  I have
already mentioned as a factor behind the resurgence of the American
model the change in the law concerning shareholders’ rights to sue
directors.  So far, it has to be said, few people who have taken
advantage of these regulations seem to have had any spectacular
success.
b) Pressure from foreign investors.  CALPERS, the Californian
pension fund, has taken to presenting the companies whose shares it
holds with comprehensive memoranda on how they should pay out
more in dividends.
c) Pressure from Japan’s own life insurance companies which are
faced with a changing balance between premium accumulation and
pension pay-out, and want more in the way of dividends, now that the
bursting of the bubble has destroyed the twenty-year myth that the
stock market would deliver capital gains for ever and for ever.
d) All these pressures grow with the progressive internationalisation
of financial markets.  The prospect of an ever-rising yen has helped
to keep Japanese capital at home.  Better 4 percent in yen
appreciating by 5 percent a year, than 8 percent in correspondingly
declining dollars.  But how far can the yen detach itself from its
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purchasing-power-parity moorings? When will expectations of a
continuously rising yen finally cease? At 70 yen to the dollar? Or
50?
e) The ideological influence of the MBAs and American-trained
university professors already mentioned, having the effect of
increasing the number of articulate people in Japan who firmly, even
fervently, believe that Americans and all their text-books have got it
right, and that proper capitalism is capitalism run for capitalists.
f) And they have the law on their side.  Remarkably few of the
Japanese who think their system has superior merits to the American,
give any thought to legal changes which might help to entrench it.26
3. What, no labour movement?  Surely, if any group should be seeking
such legal changes to consolidate the advantages for employees which
Japan’s “employee-sovereignty” form of capitalism represents, it should be
the labour unions. The major unions, representing two-thirds of all union
members,  are now integrated in a single national federation, Rengo, which
has been accepted as part of the Japanese Establishment; it enjoys regular
consultations with top officials of the main ministries, is courted by all
political parties, nominates members to government commissions.  But, as
compared, say, with German unions, both its power -- and perhaps, even,
its leaders’ inclination -- to act as an independent champion of the interests
of those they represent seems close to zero.  Union leaders who have risen
to prominence in their home union because they are willing to negotiate
under the ruling assumption that the needs of “the company” are
paramount, become national leaders who accept that the needs of “the
Japanese economy” are paramount.  And if that means getting rid of “bad
egalitarianism” and giving more attention to “merit” as a means of
strengthening Japan’s competitiveness, so be it.  And if it means mollifying
the Americans in order to keep American export markets open by, for
instance, changes in the law to strengthen the power of shareholders, then
they are ready to accept it.
And if a major Japanese company decides that it can observe the
lifetime employment guarantee no longer, (even in the acceptable
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attenuated form which permits the shukko redeployment-outside-the-firm
of older workers), and decides to take on its union and force through
compulsory redundancies, does Rengo have the will and the organizational
strength to mount effective resistance? Probably not.
One factor is clearly the disappearance of the fire-in-the-belly
socialist or communist beliefs which inspired the post-war union leaders,
and it is probably also the case that there are fewer union leaders with the
intellectual and moral stature of their post-war predecessors.  
4. Change in the quality of union leadership is a matter for speculation.
What does seem certain, however, is that the immense change since the war
in the social selection mechanisms of Japanese society -- the way the
schools, develop, select and label talent -- has had an effect on the
intellectual quality of blue-collar and high-school-graduate white-
collar workers which may well in the long-run cause managers to place
less value on their contributions to the firm and consequently make
managers less inclined to give them the consideration, and to grant them the
guaranteed place in the company, which they have hitherto enjoyed.   The
argument is as follows.  
Even in 1950, national university fees were low and the competition
to pass entrance examinations was fierce, so it is probable that, if one could
measure “native ability”, the 10 percent or so of 20-year-olds who were in
universities -- the group from whom the senior board members of today’s
corporations are drawn -- were at least among the most academically able
30 percent, the quickest and sharpest 30 percent, of their age group.  But
the universities certainly did not enrol all the quickest and sharpest.  A
good many of the brightest and best -- top decile people by any likely
measurement -- left school at 15 to support the finances of families never
far from poverty.  Often they were among those selected by their teachers
for recommendation to the recruiters from the leading companies of the
land.  It was from their ranks that were drawn the often-activist leaders of
enterprise unions in the 1960s and early 1970s, and it was they, as
foremen, who became the fertile and innovative leaders of quality circles
and continuous improvement teams in the 1970s and 1980s; alert, self-
confident, able to talk on equal terms with graduate managers and
technicians, but not, in Japan’s credential-driven society, resentful of the
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fact that their educational history put an ineluctable ceiling on their
promotion.  
In today’s more affluent, all-middle-class Japan, with university
enrollment rates more than tripled and the aspiration for a university
education diffused to practically every family in the land, children of that
relative ability level go straight through university into the managerial
ranks.  There are unlikely to be many of them among the blue-collar
workers on the shop floor.   Will those who do become blue-collar
workers continue to be as highly regarded as valuable “members of the
firm community”?
5. The fifth factor is slower growth (with the exhaustion of the
technology catch-up factor and the agriculture/industry transition process
which produced the earlier high growth rates.)  It is easier to run a Japanese
type personnel system in a corporation when there is a constantly expanding
youth-recruitment base to one’s pyramid -- easier to motivate middle-
managers with relatively good prospects of promotion, and easier to
maintain a low average wage.  This is essentially the problem of the “lump
generation” already discussed, but perhaps a problem not as specific to that
particular generation as is usually supposed.
6. The increased openness of the economy, the decline of
bureaucratic influence and less cartelisation is another factor, affecting
traditional forms of regulating competition.  Recession cartels can hardly
work any more because there are too many “outsiders” to the agreements
who can no longer be persuaded to restrain imports and so make agreed
domestic production cutbacks work to raise prices.  Deregulation is
increasingly evoked as a necessity to improve the economy’s competitive
position.  The Fair Trade Commission has been goaded by foreign criticism
into breaking up the dango cartels by which bureaucrats regulated
competition between major construction companies in ways which they
could argue served the public interest as well as that of the political parties
which benefitted from the slush funds generated.  This intensification of
competition may well make it harder to maintain traditional employment
practices.  The five big steel firms were able to take the costly route of
running down their labour force without breaking the lifetime guarantee
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because they all agreed to do it; none sought competitive advantage by
being tougher on their workers.  The relationship among them was well
exemplified when Kobe Steel was hit by the earthquake.  The other firms
agreed to take over its customers, but to give them back as soon as the
plant was repaired.  The relationship may not always be thus.
7. An unpredictable factor is the future of the technology race between
the competing Japanese and American styles of R&D and new product
development.  One element in contemporary Japanese pessimism is the
belief that the American style -- Silicon Valley and Venture Capitalists,
high mobility both of ideas and of people, the rise of a Wang or a DEC or
an Apple in this decade, their near-collapse in the next -- is superior to the
Japanese style -- patient work by talented teams, trained within the firm and
committed to careers within it, financed by giant and highly stable
corporations with greatly diversified research portfolios.  That remains,
however, to be proved.  A recent careful study27 of the way DRAMs are
developed in Japanese and American firms, suggests that the advantages of
each approach are fairly evenly balanced.  If in the long-run the overall
picture does appear different; if America continues manifestly to increase
its lead in commercial technologies over Japan, this will certainly induce
pressure for change in Japan’s corporate system.  One thing to note,
however, from the study quoted.  Producing a generation of Bill Gates and
risk-taking venture capitalists may well not be enough.  An essential part
of the American system is the public good provided by the university
system -- the large flow of science PhDs who acquire in their university
labs the knowledge and the innovative ideas which they take into their
firms, but which Japanese researchers acquire within their firms after they
have been recruited at a much younger age, as BAs or MAs.  
8.  The intensification of low-wage-cost competition is a final factor
to be taken into account.  Japan broke into world markets when it reached
world levels of technological expertise and quality at a time when its
labour was still cheap.  China is moving rapidly into that same position.
The last four years have shown that Japanese companies can still afford to
keep large work forces on their books even if the labour of many of them
could be dispensed with without loss.  The system can survive a prolonged
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cyclical shock.  But sustained pressure on prices of low-wage competition
may in the end have an erosive effect.  The hollowing-out process of
relocating overseas, is one form of threat to the traditional system.  Staying
in Japan, but continuously restructuring to cut costs is another.  I am
reminded of the remark of the former manager of a Phillips subsidiary:
“Phillips used to be a very Japanese sort of firm; we looked after our
employees and didn’t have to watch every penny -- until, that is, we had to
struggle to survive Japanese competition.”  Perhaps, in twenty years time,
one will hear Japanese managers saying:  “We used to be a very Chinese
sort of firm -- until we had to meet Chinese competition.”
VIII.  Conclusion
One would need to be very wise, or very foolish, to predict how these
factors will play over the next decade, let alone over the next quarter-
century.  I conclude with one general point.  It is often said that lifetime
employment and seniority-constrained promotion systems are the exclusive
preserve of a privileged elite, and that that elite is diminishing in size.
What count as “good jobs” -- in government service, banks and the 924
firms quoted on the first division of the Tokyo stock exchange -- now make
up 16.5 percent of employment compared with 25.4 percent in 1970,
according to one calculation28 which, however, admits that many non-
quoted firms, the newspapers, mutual insurance companies ought to be
added to any list of what the graduates of elite universities consider “good
jobs”.  But, as the numerous whole-economy statistics quoted in this paper
-- for turnover ratios, tenures, age-wage progressions, executive/employee
remuneration ratios, etc -- the firms with the “good jobs” set the norms for
the whole economy.  And even small employers, if they wish to retain the
cooperation of their workforce and the respect of their fellow-employer
reference groups, find those norms constraining.  As mentioned already, the
difference in turnover rates between small and large firms does not
primarily reflect a difference in “hire and fire” practices, but the much
greater prevalence in small firms of voluntary quits.  Those who have
“good jobs” stick with them.  Small firm employees very often can better
themselves by moving.
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If change is to come, then, it must come in the norm-setting “good
job” sector.  Which is also the sector in which most firms have unions
which have hitherto been quite effective in restraining any tendency on the
part of managers to break with traditional practices.  Whether the clearly
declining bargaining strength of the enterprise unions in wage negotiations
indicates a similar decline in their power to resist changes in the basic
features of the employment system will obviously be a key factor when the
next recession again puts the system under maximum strain.
In all its essentials, the Japanese employment system has survived the
present recession.  Next time -- ten years from now, say -- its survival may
be more problematic.
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